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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4503
This paper discusses decentralization (administrative, 
fiscal and political) of government in public service 
provision. It aims to facilitate understanding among 
practitioners, policy makers, and scholars about 
what decentralization entails in practice compared 
to theory. A review of the empirical literature and 
experience of decentralization is presented. The paper 
highlights issues that policy makers in developing and 
transitional countries should be aware of when reforming 
government, considering their unique political and 
economic environment.  
   The author argues that decentralization produces 
efficiency gains stemming from inter-jurisdictional 
This paper—a product of the Capacity Building, Partnership, and Outreach Team, Development Economics—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to disseminate research findings pertinent to development. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted atakim3@worldbank.org.  
competition, enhanced checks and balances over the 
government through voting at the subnational level, 
and informational advantages due to proximity to 
citizens. By contrast, arguments against decentralization 
include the risk of an increased level of corruption, 
coordination problems stemming from multiple layers 
of government, low capacity of subnational government, 
and unproductive inter-jurisdictional competition. 
   Decentralization itself does not render increased 
government effectiveness in public service provision.  
Instead, the effectiveness of government largely depends 
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  2 
Introduction 
 
Decentralization has been gaining increasing attention as a means of improving the 
provision of public goods and services
1 as reforming public-service delivery has moved 
to the forefront of the current policy agenda. 
2  The main economic reason behind this 
increased interest is the prospect of improving citizens’ welfare through efficiency gains 
(Tanzi 1995).  In other words, welfare is maximized if each local government provides 
the Pareto-efficient
3 level of output for its constituents through benefit pricing (Oates 
1972, p. 34-35).  The argument is that local government is more efficient to provide 
public goods and services tailored toward the preferences and tastes of individual 
residents, so as to achieve an increased level of satisfaction for them.  
At the same time, experience shows that decentralization has often been 
motivated by political reasons (e.g., dealing with a mounting budget deficit) rather than 
economic rationale (e.g., efficiency gains, increase in employment, economic 
stabilization, equity).  For example, an overburdened central government may try to 
delegate or pass on the responsibility for the provision and maintenance of public goods 
and services to local government, but without ensuring adequate institutional and 
financial provision.  In this case, decentralization neither improves welfare or the quality 
of life for residents nor increases the efficiency of the public sector. 
High expectations from decentralization seem to stem partly from recent 
experiences of failed centralized states under planned economic and political systems. 
4  
Strong pressures for the restructuring of the public sector are present today, and have 
been before in countries at differing stages of economic development.  It has been argued 
that fragmenting central authority and introducing more “Tieboutian” intergovernmental 
competition (e.g. “voting with feet”) can generate a range of benefits including making 
government more efficient and responsive. 
5  Some economists and political scientists 
also have questioned the effectiveness of central government in improving the 
distribution of income and stabilizing the economy, while advocating a smaller public 
sector by giving markets and local jurisdictions more power.  These arguments have been 
put forward along with support for privatization to improve the efficiency of the public 
sector, 
6 although it is not evident that decentralization can improve income distribution 
                                                 
1 See John G. Head (1974) for discussion on public goods and welfare.  
2 See the World Bank publications for discussion on reforming public service delivery: World 
Development Report (2004); Berlin Workshop Series (2004); Annual Bank Conference on Development 
Economics-Europe (2005) and Besley and Ghatak (2003). 
3 Pareto-efficiency refers to the situation when nothing could be done to make at least one person better off 
without hurting someone else.  The implication is that no one needs to be made worse off, while at least 
one person will have an increased level of welfare. 
4 The World Development Report 1997 (World Bank) argues that development requires an effective state 
that plays a facilitator role in encouraging and complementing the activities of private businesses and 
individuals versus reducing government to a minimalist state.  Governments with both centrally-planned 
and mixed economies are shrinking their market role because of failed state interventions. 
5 Chareles M. Tiebout (1956) argues that the Musgrave-Samuelson analysis, which is valid for federal 
expenditures, need not apply to local expenditures. 
6 Vito Tanzi, 1996, “Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and 
Macroeconomic Aspects,” in Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995, pp. 296.  
 
  3and macro management.  Cai and Treisman argue that “decentralization is sometimes 
presented as almost a functional equivalent of privatization.” 
7 
This paper examines the conceptual framework and experience surrounding 
decentralization. It aims to shed light on the effectiveness of decentralization in 
improving the provision of public services.  First, it begins by presenting definitions of 
decentralization.  Second, it discusses some of the arguments for decentralization, with 
allocative efficiency one of the main economic rationales for improving public welfare.  
Third, issues related to the implementation of decentralization are addressed.  These 
include economic factors influencing the assignment of expenditure and revenue 
responsibilities.  Some of the major revenue sources are also discussed including own 
revenue and intergovernmental transfers.  Fourth, the potential impact of decentralization 
and its implications for developing countries are reviewed by examining experience with 
decentralization.  Finally, the conclusion highlights the main points of each of these 
sections. 
 
What Is Decentralization? 
 
When discussing decentralization, it is implicitly assumed that countries have different 
levels of government (central, regional/state, municipal/local) with different degrees of 
decision-making power.  Some political scientists argue that each level of government in 
a federal system should have independent authority: on this definition, only a few 
countries would be considered to operate in a federal system (e.g., US, Canada, 
Switzland).  Meanwhile, the literature on decentralization does not uniformly agree on 
what decentralization entails.   
 
The following are some definitions of decentralization that are broadly coherent, 
but have different emphases: 
 
1.  Wallace E. Oates argues that a federal system of government is the most 
promising form for organizing the public sector in resolving the allocation, distribution, 
and stabilization problems.  There are two near polar forms of government:  
•  Complete centralization (a unitary form of government): in the absence of 
other levels of government, the central government assumes full 
responsibility for the three economic functions of the public sector.   
•  Total decentralization: the opposite direction of centralization on the 
spectrum of governmental forms that would presumably represent a state of 
anarchy.  A highly decentralized system in which the central government is 
almost completely devoid of economic responsibility.  In this case, a system 
of small local governments would perform virtually all the economic tasks of 
the public sector.  But this would be highly unrealistic. 
 
Oates sees that a unitary government has a comparative advantage in resolving 
stabilization and distribution problems (including externalities of collective goods) while 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 Cai, Honbin and Daniel Treisman, “Did government decentralization cause China’s economic miracle?” 
World Politics, forthcoming, pp.35. 
  4a decentralized government has comparative advantages in satisfying varying preferences 
of the residents of the different communities by providing public goods and services 
whose benefits are limited to a specific subset of the population.  Oates argues that 
federalism combines the advantages of these two polar forms and avoids the most serious 
shortcomings of each.
8  In a federal system, each level of government makes decisions 
concerning the provision of certain public services in its respective geographical 
jurisdiction: each does what it can do best rather than attempting to perform all the 
functions of the public sector. 
Oates argues that economists might be interested in which “different levels of 
decision-making do exist, each of which determines levels of provision of particular 
public services in response largely to the interests of its geographical constituency” 
(Oates 1972, pp. xvi).  Thus, economists’ central concerns are the allocation of resources 
and the distribution of income within an economic system.  By this definition, any fiscal 
system/government at least possesses federal elements.  In that decentralization (fiscal 
decentralization) has compelling advantages for some functions over a complete reliance 
on centralized decision-making.   
In Oates’ view it makes little difference to the economist whether or not decision-
making at a particular level of government is based on delegated or constitutionally 
guaranteed authority in contrast to the conception of federalism in political science.  Thus 
federalism should be treated not in absolute but in relative terms, in degrees rather than 
in kind. 
 
2.  Prud’homme (1994) suggests a typology that distinguishes between three types of 
decentralization: spatial, market and administrative.  Spatial decentralization is defined 
as a process of diffusing urban population and activities away from large agglomerations; 
market decentralization, economic liberalization, is defined as a process of creating 
conditions in which goods and services are provided by market mechanism; and 
administrative deconcentration is defined as the transfer of responsibility for planning, 
management, and the raising and allocation of financial resources from the central 
government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, or subordinate units or 
levels of government. 
According to Prud’homme, administrative decentralization can be subdivided into 
three types: de-concentration, delegation, and devolution.   
•  De-concentration is the redistribution of decision-making among different 
levels within the central government;  
•  Delegation is the transfer of responsibilities from the central government to 
semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central 
government but ultimately accountable to it; and  
•  Devolution is the transfer of powers from the central government to 
independent sub-national governments.  However, this typology does not 
                                                 
8  Oates interprets Kenneth C. Wheare’s definition of federalism: a political system provided by the 
constitution that protects the autonomy of different levels of government, “...the method of dividing powers 
so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent (Oates 
1972, pp.16).”  A political study of federalism is concerned with the division and use of power, by 
excluding from the federal category a system in which the power of sub-national governments is exercised 
solely at the convenience of the central government: delegation.  
  5seem to hold always: the word “decentralization” is often being used for a 
synonym for “devolution.” 
9   
 
3.  Vito Tanzi ( 1996) describes decentralization in two broad categories: 
•  De-concentration: implies only a delegation of administrative control to 
lower levels (sub-national governments in the administrative hierarchy) and   
•  Decentralization: genuine possession of independent decision-making power 
by decentralized units. 
 
4.  Richard M. Bird and Francois Vaillancourt (2006) consider three types of 
decentralization:  
•  De-concentration: giving regional or local offices of the central government 
decision-making power previously held in the central offices in the capital; 
•  Delegation: making a sub-national government responsible for carrying out a 
function for which the central government retains responsibility; and 
•  Devolution: transferring responsibilities from the central government to sub-
national governments. 
 
5.  James Manor (1999) considers three types of decentralization: de-concentration or 
administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and devolution or democratic 
decentralization. 
10   
•  De-concentration/administrative decentralization: refers to the dispersal of 
agents of higher levels of government into lower level arena.  However when 
de-concentration (even with fiscal decentralization) occurs in isolation 
without simultaneous democratization, it still enables the central authority to 
penetrate more effectively into lower level arena without increasing the 
influence of interests at those arena.  This could be especially true in 
developing countries. 
•  Fiscal decentralization: refers to downward fiscal transfers to lower levels 
influencing over budgets and financial decisions.  Fiscal decentralization in 
isolation without democratization would face the same problems mentioned 
above (e.g., central control) although it is less prone to these tendencies than 
de-concentration. 
•  Devolution/democratization: refers to the transfer of resources and power 
(and tasks) to lower level authorities which are largely or wholly independent 
of higher levels of government, and which are democratic in some way and to 
some degree. 
 
6.  Cai and Treisman illustrate three types of decentralization based on examination 
of common usage. 
•  Administrative decentralization occurs when subnational agents are permitted 
by national authorities to make certain policy decisions, subject to review. 
                                                 
9 Rémy Prud’homme (1994) pp. 2. 
10 Manor excludes other three types of decentralization, namely, decentralization by default (when 
government institutions become so ineffective, fail to influence lower level arenas), privatization, and 
delegation (of responsibilities for development programs or projects to para-statal agencies).  
  6•  Political decentralization occurs when either: (1) subnational governments 
have the right to make certain policy decision not subject to being overruled 
by higher levels, or (2) subnational officials are chosen by local residents. 
•  Fiscal decentralization implies various forms of fiscal allocation to 
subnational governments depending on a specific government. 
 
In summary, three general types of decentralization are presented: administrative, 
fiscal, and political.   
•  Administrative decentralization takes place when funds are allocated to 
decentralized units that carry out their spending activities even if most taxes 
are raised centrally.
11  It should be noted that in many developing countries, 
subnational governments act as agents of the central government according to 
guidelines imposed by the central government rather than making 
independent spending decisions. 
•  Fiscal decentralization exists when sub-national governments have decision-
making power, authorized by the constitution or legislation, to raise revenues 
(taxes) and perform spending activities.
12   
•  Political decentralization exists when public officials (e.g., governor, mayor, 
council member) at sub-national governments are elected by secret ballots, 
and sub-national governments are given independent power for decision-
making by constitutional or legislative authority.  
 
Table 1: Types of decentralization and their characteristics 
 









making power by sub-
national government 
for raising revenues 
and allocation of 
financial resources 
Free election in 
selecting officials (e.g., 
mayor, council) of 
subnational 
governments by secret 
ballots 
 
In practice, decentralization is often used with interchangeably devolution, and 
de-centralization with delegation.  It also should be noted that decentralization, in a 
theoretical sense (and in an ideal world), requires the simultaneous occurrence of all these 
three types of decentralization (administrative, fiscal, and political) in order to realize the 
full potential benefits.  However, in the real world (and more so in developing countries) 
each of these can occur in isolation, or any two (or all) can occur simultaneously to 
different degrees.
13  Thus, decentralization can be better described as an evolutionary 
                                                 
11 Italy could be considered as an administratively decentralized country where local entities raise a small 
amount of total revenue but spend a relatively large portion of total net expenditure (Vito Tanzi 1996, pp. 
297). 
12 Examples of fiscal decentralization include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Germany, 
Nigeria, Switzerland, and the United States (Vito Tanzi 1996, pp. 297). 
13 James Manor (1999). 
  7process for allocating administrative, fiscal, or political power to subnational 
governments, rather than being defined precisely by these specific features. 
  For example, in measuring fiscal decentralization, the most widely used indicator 
is the population weighted average share of subnational expenditure and revenue in the 
total public sector, as reported in the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund.  The average expenditure and revenue shares of subnational 
governments in twenty-eight countries have been increasing steadily over time since 
1980.  However, GFS is not an ideal data set for measuring fiscal decentralization: 
although it provides a breakdown of expenditures by function and economic type, it lacks 
information on the degree of expenditure autonomy.  On the revenue side, GFS does not 
provide information on whether taxes are collected through shared taxes, piggy-backed 
taxes, or locally determined “own-source” taxes, or what proportion of intergovernmental 
transfers is conditional or unconditional (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002).   
Another effort is underway by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to measure the degree of subnational autonomy over expenditure 
decisions as well as own-revenues and grants (see Bell and Ebel 2006).  Roy Bahl sums 
up that “fiscal decentralization refers to an intergovernmental system where the balance 





In recent years, many countries around the world have begun to undertake 
decentralization in response to “government failure” in delivering public goods and 
services.  It is viewed as a way to make government more efficient, responsive, and 
accountable.  These perceived benefits of decentralization have attracted a diverse range 
of supporters
15 that favor small government, free-markets, and a bottom-up approach, 
while privatization is encouraged as a way to advance decentralization (Tanzi 1996, 
Bardhan 2002).  Before discussing the rationale for decentralization, a brief note on 
efficiency regarding the provision of public services is in order since the government’s 
resource allocation policies (e.g., revenue and expenditure) influence it.  First, two 
dimensions of efficiency are discussed: productive and allocative.  Second, arguments for 
improving welfare through government allocation are considered.
 16   
Productive efficiency is when the economy is working on its production 
possibility frontier: this is when production of one good is achieved at the lowest cost 
possible, given the production of the other good(s).
17  In other words, it is the highest 
possible output of one good, given the production level of the other good(s).  Meanwhile, 
allocative efficiency is the market (in this case the public sector) condition whereby 
                                                 
14 Bahl (1999, pp. 4) 
15 Pranab Bardhan calls them “anarcho-communitarians” (2002, pp. 186). 
16 Allocation function is one of the three major economic functions of government identified by among 
others, Musgrave (1956), Oates (1972); the other two functions are the distribution function and the 
stabilization function. 
17 A production possibilities curve (PPC) or “transformation curve” is a graph that shows the different 
quantities of two goods that an economy can produce if it uses its limited productive resources efficiently. 
Points along the curve describe the trade-off between the two goods.  This curve shows the possibilities 
open for increasing the output of one good by reducing the output of another.   
  8resources are allocated in a way that maximizes the net benefit attained through their use.  
Allocative efficiency refers to a situation in which the limited resources of a country are 
allocated in accordance with the wishes of consumers. An allocatively efficient economy 
produces an "optimal mix" of commodities.  Resources are used allocatively efficiently if 
they are spent for producing the right mix of goods for the right people at the right price.  
That is to say, in a situation where society produces goods and services at minimum cost 
that satisfy the preferences of consumers, resources are allocated efficiently.   
A set of rules devised
18 in welfare economics if fulfilled will give rise to a Pareto 
Optimum, i.e., no one can be made better off without someone else being worse off.  In 
other words, if somebody could be made better off without making any other person 
worse off, then clearly welfare is not maximized, and therefore resources are not 
allocatively efficient.  If an economy is perfectly competitive, it is assumed that 
equilibrium exists, i.e. Pareto-efficiency, based on individual welfare.  
However, Pareto-efficiency does not ensure socially desirable objective such as 
equity.  In addition, Pareto-efficiency based on individual welfare may not also be 
efficient because of externalities since individuals take account only direct effects on 
themselves, not the effect on others.  Furthermore, a competitive economy may not 
ensure a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources due to “imperfect information.”  The role 
of government is thus to ensure the correct supply of public goods while its intervention 
in markets is justified on the ground of correcting “market failures.” 
19   
Furthermore, unlike the private sector which has the single goal of maximizing 
profits for its share holders, the public sector’s goal is to increase the benefit of the public 
at large—even though preferences are diffuse and welfare may be hard to measure.  In 
this sense, Bergson (1983) suggests that a “Pareto-improvement” should be concerned 
with “normative efficiency” in formulating optimization criteria. 
20  
In the context of decentralization, a Pareto efficient allocation of resources alone 
may not necessarily lead to the optimal allocation of resources to meet the collective 
interest of citizens in a particular jurisdiction.  Because Pareto efficiency does not 
necessarily produce public goods and services that reflect the desirable characteristics of 
these services, simply that no one person could be made better off without making some 
other person worse off.  There is no consideration, for example, for equity.  Thus, 
allocative efficiency occurs when the public sector produces public goods and services 
most valued by society.  This means scarce resources are allocated to the production of 
goods and services so that citizens’ wants and needs are met in the best way possible. 
21 
As alluded before, the role of the public sector is to achieve a welfare optimum by 
allocating resources efficiently and facilitating economies i.e., through providing 
necessary public goods and services in promoting job growth, fair income distribution, 
                                                 
18  The basic theorems of welfare economics require that the economy is perfectly competitive and there is 
a full set of markets (e.g. identical marginal rate of substitution in consumption, identical marginal rate of 
transformation in production) and a number of market conditions (e.g. asymmetric information, 
externalities, natural monopoly, and principal and agent problems) may not lead to inefficiency. 
19 See Joseph Stiglitz (1980) for detailed discussion. 
20 For further discussion see: Abram Bergson (1954, 1983) for social welfare; John Rawls (1971) for “max-
min” utility function concerning equity and social economic justice; Amartya Sen (1984) for equity and 
poverty.  
21 See Joseph Atkinson, A. B. and Joseph Stiglitz (1980) for detailed discussion on issues of efficiency and 
the economics of the public sector. 
  9and efficient allocation of resources (Musgrave 1959, Oates 1972).  Although these three 
functions are conceptually distinctive, they are fundamentally interdependent and 
moreover, at a policy level, any public problem will have an impact on the attainment of 
all three of the objectives of public policy.
22   
However, there exist different levels of decision-making in a federal structure
23 of 
the public sector; each of which determines the provision of particular public services in 
responding largely to the interests of its geographical constituency (Oates 1972).  An 
ideal case, “the optimal form of federal government to provide the set of n public goods 
would be one in which there exists a level of government for each subset of the 
population over which the consumption of a public good is defined.” 
24  Oates calls this 
ideal case “perfect correspondence” in the provision of public goods in which a perfect 
match exists between the jurisdiction of each government unit and the group that 
collectively consume the goods.
25  For example, special districts in the U.S. reflect this 
concern such as fire, sewerage, and water districts.  However, it should be noted that it is 
implicitly assumed that the costs of providing each level of output of the good
26 in each 
jurisdiction are the same for the central or the respective local government.   
For example, central government tends to be better equipped at dealing with 
stabilization and distribution problems (e.g., monetary and fiscal policy) in maintaining 
the economy at the national level, while local governments are constrained in their 
capacity to regulate the aggregate level of economic activity.  On the other hand, local 
governments may be more efficient, for example, in providing public goods of a local 
nature (e.g., refuse collection) for their constituency.  They have comparative advantages 
over central government to provide the mix of public goods and services that best reflect 
the preferences of individuals in the jurisdiction since they have better access to 
information on local affairs.  While a centralized government might not be well informed 
about them or ignore the difference, and would thus tend to supply a uniform package to 
all residents, and does not deliver the Pareto-optimal level of satisfaction for them.  Thus 
the main economic argument for decentralization is largely based on allocative efficiency 
grounds (Tanzi 1994). 
  According to Oates, “it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for 
local government to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective 
jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specific and uniform level of 
output across all jurisdictions.” 
27  The argument is that welfare is maximized if each 
local government provides the Pareto-efficient output for its constituency based on the 
principle of “perfect correspondence.”  Olson (1969) also argues that there is allocative 
efficiency where the boundaries of a government and a collective good it provides 
                                                 
22 Wallace E. Oates, 1972, Fiscal Federalism,  
23 Oates (1972) argues that “any fiscal system is federal or at least possesses federal elements” and “it is not 
surprising, for decentralized finance has such compelling advantages for some functions that one would not 
expect to find a total reliance on centralized decision-making on fiscal matter (pp. xvi).” 
24 Oates (1972) pp. 34. 
25 Oates (1972) pp. 34. 
26 If this is not the case, for example, if the central government can realize important economies of scale 
(scope) in the provision of the good that are not available to the local government individually, 
centralization may be desirable despite the decentralized character of the consumption of the good (Oates 
1972), pp. 37. 
27 Oates (1972) pp. 35. 
  10coincide.  “There is a need for a separate governmental institution for every collective 
good with a unique boundary, so that there can be a match between those who receive the 
benefits of a collective good and those who pay for it (pp. 483).” 
  In addition, the incentives for decentralization are likely to be greater the more 
varied the efficient levels of output across jurisdictions; for the more pronounced will be 
the divergence of any uniform level of output from the efficient level in most localities.  
For a given population size, the welfare gain from the decentralized provision of a 
particular local public good becomes greater as the diversity in individual demands 
within the country as a whole increases and as each geographical grouping of consumers 
becomes more homogeneous in terms of their demands for the good (see appendix for 
graphical presentation).   
At the same time, the “subsidiarity principle” 
28 argues that the efficient provision 
of public goods and services requires that the government satisfy citizens’ needs and 
preferences as much as possible.  Taxing, spending, and regulatory functions should be 
exercised by lower levels of government unless a convincing case can be made for 
assigning them to higher levels of government.  This principle is the opposite of the 
residuality principle applied in a unitary country, where local governments are assigned 
functions by the central government.  Thus the subsidiarity principle and decentralization 





As shown from experience in decentralization, it is rarely the case all of the three types of 
decentralization occur simultaneously.  Instead, it is more common to see one or two 
aspects of decentralization implemented in many countries; when governments 
decentralize they are often really deconcentrating or delegating rather than devolving 
responsibility (Martinez-Vazquez, McLure, and Vaillancourt 2006).  At various degrees 
and scopes of decentralization, countries around the world have attempted to expand the 
role of sub-national governments in providing public goods and services for their 
citizens.
29  Most subnational governments deal with fiscal activities for generating 
revenue and making decisions on spending (expenditure) for the provision of public 
goods and services.  
 
a. Assigning Functional and Expenditure Responsibilities 
  
As mentioned in the previous section, the division of expenditure and revenue 
responsibilities and revenue sources is largely determined by how government activities 
are assigned to different levels of government.  At the same time, assignments of 
functional responsibilities depend on the relative competence of different levels of 
government for carrying out a particular functional area.  The three major functions of 
government include: macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution, and resource 
                                                 
28 Martinez-Vazquez et al (2006, pp. 18) states that “this is put forward as a key principle in the proposed 
European constitution (Article 1-9).”  
29 Roy Bahl (1999) does not see “true fiscal decentralization” would be viable in developing countries at 
least in the short run, given their very limited tax base at the local level. 
  11allocation.  Four criteria can be used to assess the assignment of functional and 
expenditure responsibilities. 
 
  Four Criteria.  At the same time, each level of government is responsible for 
activities based on four (not exhaustive) criteria: economies of scale; the presence of 
externalities; heterogeneity of preferences and of circumstances; and emulation.
30   
•  Economies of scale: vary across goods and services and size of jurisdiction. 
For example, the unit cost per good drops as the quantity of the good 
increases.  The existence of significant economies of scale constitutes an 
argument for a higher level of government to provide a particular good or 
service. 
•  The presence of externalities (negative or positive):  provision of a good or 
service may have spill-over effects beyond a particular jurisdiction.  The 
presence of external effects is a consideration in determining the optimal-
sized group to serve a particular good.  For example, the smaller the group, 
the less the external effects are likely to be internalized.  The greater the 
externalities (as aggregate welfare gain or loss becomes larger), a higher level 
of government provision is desirable.
31 
•  Heterogeneity of preferences and of circumstances: when there is the 
existence of heterogeneous preferences among geographical subsets of the 
total population, welfare would be maximized if each local government 
satisfies the unique preferences of its citizens by providing a particular good 
or service tailored to citizens’ preference (e.g., quality) instead of uniform 
provision of a good across the region or country by the central government.  
•  Emulation: refers to competition, which facilitates introducing best practices 
in government, requires two or more jurisdictions involved in a given 
activity; an argument for decentralizing government activities. 
 
b. Two Major Sources of Subnational Government Revenue: Local Taxes and 
Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
Governments carry out their responsibilities through spending.  Expenditures 
should be matched by revenues.  Revenues basically consist of three sources: local tax 
revenues, intergovernmental transfer, and to some extent, borrowing.  Borrowing is 
certainly another option, but recent studies (Tanzi 1996; Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 
2005) suggest this may be problematic because of the lack of hard budget constraints 
imposed on subnational government in most developing countries (and in many OECD 
countries).  Central government bail-outs are rather common and the weak enforceability 
of hard budget constraints of subnational governments puts macro-economic stability at 
risk (Tanzi 1996, Bardhan 2002, Tommasi 2006).  This is particularly a problem for 
developing countries, except perhaps for a few wealthy metropolitan cities.   
                                                 
30 Martinez-Vazquez, McLure, and Vaillancourt (2006). 
31 Oates (1972, pp. 46) adds “free-rider” problems when the provision of the good elsewhere can serve a 
substitute for local provision of a good.  Then there will be an incentive to engage in “free-rider” behavior 
(accentuates with a large number of small jurisdictions of consumers). 
  12However, only two sources will be discussed in this paper.  Local tax revenues 
typically include income taxes (piggy backed to federal income taxes in many developing 
countries due to collection difficulties), property taxes, user fees, license, excise fees.  
Intergovernmental transfer (reflecting disparities between central and subnational 
governments and across different subnational governments) can be conditional (e.g. 
matching grants) or unconditional (revenue sharing) grants from the central government.  
Depending on the degree and scope of decentralization, sub-national governments either 
have autonomy deciding on what to and how to spend money on goods and services or 
they have to follow guidelines imposed by the central government.  However, it should 
be noted that in most countries subnational governments have very limited tax bases and 
capacity to set tax rates and administer the collection of taxes.  As a result, the central 
government determines the tax base and rates as well as collecting centrally.  Thus, 
intergovernmental transfer is the most important resource for subnational government. 
 
b-1. Own Revenue Sources of Subnational Government 
 
The Principle of Benefit Taxation.  Subnational governments raise their own 
resources from various taxes and fees.  If subnational governments are to achieve true 
fiscal decentralization, they must control their own sources of revenue.  Thus important 
questions are which revenue sources can and should be assigned to subnational levels of 
government and how these assignments will be carried out.  The principle of benefit 
taxation
32 represents that to the extent possible, goods and services provided by the 
government should be financed by fees and taxes.  Olson refers to “fiscal equivalence” in 
which there is a match between those who receive the benefits of a collective good and 
those who pay for it (1969). Tax payments should reflect the costs and benefits of public 
goods and services. This is fair and efficient in the sense of encouraging responsible use 
of the nation’s scarce resources.  Such taxes levied on motor vehicles and fuels are some 
of the examples of benefit-related taxes used for the construction and maintenance of 
roads. 
The assignment of taxes should match the benefits derived from spending based 
on assigned responsibilities and expenditures of each level of government.   Approaches 
to assigning revenues to subnational governments differ in the degree of fiscal autonomy 
in terms of the ease of compliance and administration, the fairness and neutrality they 
can likely produce, and the degree of interjuridictional redistribution they can 
accommodate.  According to Martinez-Vazquez et al (2006), four aspects of revenue 
assignment can be distinguished: (1) which level of government chooses the taxes from 
which subnational governments receive revenue; (2) which level defines the tax base; (3) 
which level sets the tax rates; and (4) which level administers the taxes.  For the view of 
subnational fiscal sovereignty, the authority to set rates is the most important of these 
because the choice of rates is what allows subnational government to choose the level of 
public services.  However, excessive subnational latitude in the choice of tax bases and in 
tax administration can cause unacceptable administrative burdens and distortions in the 
allocation of resources.   
 
                                                 
32 The principle of benefit taxation refers that within the context of the just distribution of income, 
consumers finance the cost of public goods and services by payments in accordance with benefits received. 
  13Approaches for Subnational taxes.  In general three approaches are practiced.  
Under a first approach, subnational governments have fiscal autonomy provided by 
independent subnational legislation and administration in choosing taxes they levy, tax 
bases, setting the tax rates, and administering the taxes.  This approach is practiced in 
Canada, Switzerland, and the United States.  Under a second approach, a higher level of 
government defines the tax base and collects both its own and surcharges set by 
subnational governments.  With this approach, subnational governments retain the 
attributes of fiscal sovereignty in the tax field by setting the tax rate rather than retaining 
the ability to define the tax bases and administer taxes.  Under a third approach (tax 
sharing), subnational governments receive fixed fractions of revenues from particular 
national taxes originating within their boundaries.  However, this approach restricts 
subnational governments’ fiscal autonomy even if they have authority over spending a 
given amount of revenue (see Tommasi 2006 for extensive discussion on tax sharing in 
Argentina during the 1990s). 
Based on the traditional theory of fiscal federalism (easy to administer locally and 
mainly imposed on local residents), subnational governments are usually given a limited 
tax base such as property tax, taxes on vehicles, and user charges and fees.  These limited 
sources of revenue impose difficulties on subnational governments in financing necessary 
public services.  For example, property tax is not sufficient to meet major social 
expenditures in most cases; in addition, it is costly and difficult to administer. 
33  Richard 
Bird (2006) argues that good subnational taxes should satisfy two main criteria: (1) they 
should provide sufficient revenue for the autonomous fiscal units, at least for the richest 
subnational units; and (2) good subnational taxes should impose fiscal responsibility at 
the margin on subnational governments by allowing them to establish their own tax rates 
with respect to at least some major taxes. 
 
Major Tax Sources for Subnational Government.  The following are the major 
tax sources for subnational governments (local and regional).   
•  User charges: these are based on the principle of “willingness to pay” rather 
than the principle of “ability to pay.” Citizens should value what the public 
sector supplies, at least at its marginal cost.  It is a way to assess the true 
demand for the goods or services the public sector supplies, thus the 
economic efficiency in allocating resources can be enhanced.  However, the 
importance of user charges is greater in principle than the relatively small 
amount of revenues collected from this source in most countries. 
•  Property taxes: in spite of difficulties in assessing the value of property and 
administrative costs, a low-rate and uniform property tax is important in 
financing local governments in most countries.  Subnational governments 
usually finance “hard” services such as local roads and garbage collection out 
of property taxes.  However if these governments are to expand their roles 
into “soft” services such as education and health, then they will need to have 
access to more elastic revenue sources.    
•  Excise taxes: while the property tax is the pre-eminently local tax, excise 
taxes (on alcohol and tobacco) could be a significant source of subnational 
                                                 
33 Bell and Bowman (2005) explore a way to extend local property taxation into communal lands in rural 
South Africa.  
  14revenue.  Excise taxes are relatively easy to administer and lend themselves to 
regionally-differentiated rate determination.  In addition, a general benefit 
argument can be made for some regional excises, for example, on alcohol and 
tobacco to the extent that subnational governments are responsible for health 
expenditures and on vehicles and fuel to the extent that they are responsible 
for regional and local roads. 
•  Other potential sources of taxes include personal income taxes, payroll taxes, 
sales tax, and business taxes.  Except user charges to some extent, most of 
these taxes (including property and excise) are not likely reduce local and 
regional disparities between jurisdictions. 
 
To implement fiscal decentralization, three principles are suggested for 
subnational taxation (Bird 2006): (1) attention should be paid to matching expenditure 
and revenue needs; (2) an effort should be made to ensure that all governments bear 
significant responsibility at the margin for financing the expenditures for which they are 
politically responsible; and (3) subnational taxes should not unduly distort the allocation 
of resources.  In many developing and transition countries, however, problems related to 
subnational taxation would largely remain unsolved in the foreseeable future even if there 
are major reforms of subnational tax regimes, due to limited tax bases and administrative 
capacity at the subnational level.  That is why many transition countries have opted for 
shared taxes. 
 
b-2. Intergovernmental Transfers    
 
 Regarding  intergovernmental  transfer, several experts (Oates 1972, Bhal 1999) 
argue that unconditional grants are preferable to conditional grants in promoting 
decentralization.  In the case of conditional grants, the central government defines to 
some extent, the objectives for which sub-national governments are to use the grants in 
promoting positive externalities across regions (e.g. education, health programs, inter-
regional transportation network).  On the other hand, with unconditional grants, 
subnational governments can employ the grants according to their own set of priorities 
and objectives.  But, there is an indication that conditional grants (e.g. matching grants) 
that earmark to infrastructure are more likely to promote infrastructure investment (Oates 
1972) more than non-conditional grants.  It might also be desirable if the central 
government wants to promote positive externalities generated by multi-jurisdictional 
infrastructure projects through this kind of subsides (“Pigovian” subsidies).  Then, the 
central government may want to use conditional grants as a policy tool in creating certain 
incentives for sub-national governments.   
Unconditional grants, to some extent, imbed an element of the welfare optimum 
involving both allocative efficiency and an equitable distribution of income (Oates 1972, 
pp. 78).   In Australia, Canada, and several European states, the central government 
makes substantial unconditional grants to subnational governments containing significant 
equalizing features.  
34  At the same time, a national program that distributes income 
                                                 
34 Based on equal per-capita grants to all states, the grants are usually financed by the progressive federal 
income tax which wealthier jurisdictions would pay in a larger sum per capita to support the grant program 
although they receive the same per-capita grant as poor states. 
  15among individuals, not among jurisdictions, is the preferred alternative to achieve a just 
distribution of income among individuals in a country.  Unconditional grants are also 
used for the promotion of horizontal equity (the equal treatment of equals)
35 among 
jurisdictions.    The central government seeks to equalize the fiscal capacity of all 
jurisdictions by instituting a transfer program of unconditional grants to poorer localities.  
For example, grant per capita can vary inversely with the level of per-capita income in 
the jurisdiction.   
Most countries use both conditional and unconditional grants to more 
decentralized levels of government.  The former are typically used to encourage spending 
on such items as education, health, highways, and regional roads, which involve 
significant interjurisdictional positive externalities, in addition to support explicitly 
redistributive programs.  The major conditional grant programs intend to achieve two 
primary objectives: (1) the achievement of national minimum levels of certain basic 
public services; and (2) an equalization across jurisdictions of the “fiscal effort” required 
to provide these minimum program levels.  It is to ensure that every individual has access 
to a sound program of public services within his chosen locality at a cost in line with 
what he would pay elsewhere. 
Moreover, these intergovernmental grants in general involve equalizing 
provisions (e.g., horizontal equalization) so that poorer jurisdictions receive more 
generous support by incorporating provision to account for the particular expenditure 
requirement, or “need” of each jurisdiction in addition to its “fiscal capacity” to meet that 
need.  Intergovernmental transfer thus can be interpreted as a policy tool by the central 
government in achieving one of its prime responsibilities in achieving income 
redistribution.  In addition a good intergovernmental transfer system should provide fiscal 
incentives for local governments to economize on expenditures and to raise their own 
resources. 
 
Challenges and Potential Impacts and of Decentralization 
with Implications for Developing Countries 
 
Policymakers, researchers and the public have long been interested in ways to increase 
the effectiveness of the public sector.  The core of the debate lies in how government can 
improve the welfare of its citizens through adequate provision of public services, from 
opportunities for education and employment to the provision of clean water.  
Decentralization has been seen by a wide range of advocates as a way to increase the 
efficiency and enhance the accountability of the public sector, i.e. improving the 
governance of the public sector.  These potential benefits have engendered an enthusiasm 
for decentralization in both developing and developed countries.  Developing countries 
are turning to decentralization to escape from the traps of ineffective public sectors, while 
developed countries look for effective tools to reorganize the government in order to 
efficiently provide public services in the “post-welfare state” era (Bennett 1990; World 
Bank 1997; Bird and Vaillancourt 2006). 
                                                 
35 Musgrave (1959) argues in The Theory of Public Finance (pp. 160) that “perhaps the most widely 
accepted principle of equity in taxation is that people in equal positions should be treated equally.”  Grants 
are also provided to alleviate vertical fiscal disequilibrium between different levels of government by 
assessing the needs based on such indicators as population, urban density.   
  16  However, decentralization is neither good nor bad.  “It is a means to an end, often 
imposed by political reality (World Bank 1999, pp. 107).”  In addition, it is increasingly 
clear that the benefits of decentralization can easily be undermined by potential costs 
such as increasing indebtedness, high deficits, and procyclical finances of subnational 
governments and regional disparities (Wolman 1994; Prud’homme 1994, 1996; Tanzi 
1996; Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005; Tommasi 
2006).  At the same time, the potential allocative efficiency gains of decentralization 
stemming from satisfying unique preferences of citizens in jurisdictions may not be 
realized as assumed in theory.  Because in most developing countries, the problem is not 




  Regarding public sector accountability, it is argued that the accountability of the 
public sector will be improved because ineffective local officials would be voted out 
from their office because the taxpayers will express their preferences in their votes.  
However experience shows that local elections are often dictated by personal loyalties or 
political party loyalties.  Even if taxpayers vote based on their preferences, it is often the 
case that voters have limited access to relevant information (“asymmetric information”) 
and often limited capacity to digest the information (see Sappington and Stiglitz 1987 for 
asymmetric information; Downs 1957 for voting in democracies
36).  Devarajan et al 
(2007) show that the “missing link” between citizens and local government officials in 
the provision of public services is due to the lack of enforceability of local officials’ 
accountability.  This problem tends to be more severe in developing countries.  
  At the same time, there is no guarantee that locally elected officials will fulfill 
their obligation to satisfy the revealed preference.  Incentive systems are such that the 
officials may satisfy a number of influential people in business and political communities 
(“local elites”) instead of their constituency in order to be re-elected.  In particular if re-
election depends largely on the influence of local leaders and interest groups rather than 
on the local performance of public services, as it usually takes longer than the election 
cycle to produce tangible benefits with policy changes. Thus “local capture” can easily 
undermine the benefits of decentralization by incurring new costs (e.g. poor subnational 
tax collection, distortionary subnational taxation, inefficient provision of local public 
goods).  
  Experience on decentralization also points to the effects of corruption at the local 
level although there is no conclusive evidence whether centralized or decentralized 
government creates higher costs related to corruption (see Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip 
Mookherjee 2005 for a detailed survey on corruption).  Several studies warn that 
corruption is costly in terms of allocative efficiency and production efficiency.  For 
example, bribes and kickbacks from suppliers would lead to an oversupply of services.  
                                                 
36 Downs (1957) argues that the empirical observation of the economic theory of a democracy suggest that 
democracy is an imperfect political system as the government is chiefly motivated to maximize the most 
votes instead of maximizing the social welfare of the society.  This imposes continuous challenges to 
governments and citizens alike as to what degree we can collectively ensure a relatively equal society 
where the will of people and the public interest are represented relative to the proportion of the population 
and not relative to the endowment of resources, to help ensure economic and political stability. 
  17At the same time, productive efficiency would be undermined when cost-saving 
technologies and policies are not adopted.   
 
b. Regional Disparities and Economic Development 
 
  Decentralization can also increase regional disparities between jurisdictions.  
Prud’homme (1994, 1996) argues that decentralized redistribution is likely to lead to 
different treatment of similar individuals in a country.  For example, jurisdictions with 
higher per capita income would be able to provide higher levels of public services than 
those with lower per capita income.  Residents in wealthier jurisdictions could even be 
levied at lower tax rates for higher levels of public services than those in poor 
jurisdictions.   
Moreover, political fragmentation could hamper the promotion of regional 
economic performance and worsen the disparities within it.  For example, local 
metropolitan governments compete with each other as locations for employers so as to 
improve their tax base.  This need not increase the aggregate level of employment in 
metropolitan areas, it merely redistributes employment.  Local governments have 
incentives to exclude high cost residents and are reluctant to invest in improving the skills 
of the poor.  Fragmentation tends to encourage a “beggar thy neighbor” policy (Wolman 
H. et al 1992).  Therefore equity between localities and individuals should be a concern 
when considering decentralization.  In many developing countries where income 
distributions between jurisdictions and individuals are skewed, equity and fairness should 
be an important consideration in designing decentralization.  
Experience on decentralized government in the U.S. also raises an issue related to 
public policy in promoting development through state enterprise zone programs. Peters 
and Fisher (2002) argue that excessive competition between states and localities to attract 
business and firms through enterprise zone programs has not produced any noticeable 
positive impacts on either job growth or tax revenue.  Front-loading incentives for 
attracting business through tax rebates and infrastructure provision have failed to provide 
any sustained investment growth; instead the venture has wasted tax revenues of the 
subnational government.  Although subnational governments should take an active role in 
promoting economic growth within their jurisdictions, the fragmented government 
structure does not seem well equipped to implement coherent economic development 
strategies for long term economic growth. 
 
C. Local Capacity 
 
Although their decentralization experience has not resulted in the macroeconomic 
instability associated with Latin America, White and Smoke (2005) observe that East 
Asian countries face the major challenges in decentralization.  One of them is the poor 
accountability and weak capacity (both financial and human resources) of subnational 
governments.  The other two relate to the sound assignment of functions among different 
levels of government and concerns for the sufficient allocation of own-source revenues to 
subnational governments to ensure the adequate provision of services.  
At the same time, Yilmaz, Hegedus, and Bell (2003) emphasize that in order to 
realize the full potential of decentralization, the availability of necessary information at 
  18the local level is critical.  In many developing countries, as local governments take a 
more active role in the provision of education and health services (which help reduce 
poverty), weak statistical capacity at the subnational level to produce the household data 
needed to identify potential beneficiaries and monitoring progress in poverty reduction 
prevents full realization of decentralization.   
Bardhan (2002) also highlights the need to strengthen the local capacity of 
information and accounting systems and mechanisms of monitoring the performance of 
public bureaucrats in developing countries.  For instance, attention should be paid to 
special incentives and devices to check bureaucratic corruption, thus the differential 
efficacy of such mechanisms under centralization and decentralization can be evaluated.  
In many developing countries, one of the major goals is to effectively reach out to the 
poor—targeting success in poverty alleviation programs is treated as an important 
criterion, rather than the efficiency of interregional resource allocation.  Thus, 
redistribution to disadvantaged groups or regions at the subnational level can improve the 
potential for productive investment and human resource development on the part of 




Musgrave (1956) argues that a federal structure for the public sector has the greatest 
potential for resolving the stabilization, distribution, and allocation problems while Oates 
emphasizes that all forms of government in one way or another share the characteristics 
of federalism, regardless of degree of centralization or decentralization.  Theories of 
federalism and empirical studies suggest that there tends to be an inverse relationship 
between centralization and income level, population size, and diversity (cultural, ethnic, 
regional, racial).  At the same time, many developing countries are searching for an 
alternative to the ineffective provision of public services by the central state.  Thus, it is 
likely that many countries are likely to face issues of decentralization as countries grow 
in terms of income and population, and to improve the efficiency of provision of public 
goods and services. 
First, this paper discussed several definitions of decentralization.  It showed that 
devolution is often used interchangeably with decentralization, while delegation is often 
substituted for de-concentration.  In general, decentralization refers to the independent 
decision-making authority of subnational government in its administrative, fiscal, and 
political affairs.  But in reality, most countries are likely to simultaneously deal with 
issues related to these two dimensions (e.g., delegation and devolution) of 
decentralization, not just one or the other. 
Second, the paper presented efficiency arguments for decentralization, by 
examining theories of federalism where each level of government has a comparative 
advantage in the provision of particular public services.  For example, the central 
government might be more efficient in dealing with macrostabilization and redistribution 
policies. However, subnational government is able to more efficiently provide public 
services of a local nature within its jurisdiction, because it has better access to relevant 
information and is more accountable for satisfying the preferences of its residents.  Thus, 
decentralization of certain public services will improve the welfare of a country’s citizens 
at the aggregate level. 
  19Third, in discussing implementing decentralization, it was argued that the proper 
assignment of functional responsibilities depends on the relative competence of different 
levels of government for carrying out a particular functional area (e.g., macroeconomic 
stabilization, income redistribution, and resource allocation).  Four factors (externalities, 
economies of scale and scope, heterogeneity of preference, and emulation) are considered 
for assigning functional responsibilities.  It is argued that certain types of economic 
parameters influence the structure and operation of the public sector, although the 
structure of a particular country is largely the result of the unique political and social 
history of that nation.  At the same time, the assignment of government activities 
determines the division of expenditure and revenue responsibilities.   
Expenditures are financed through subnational own sources of revenue and 
intergovernmental transfers.  Subnational government’s own sources of revenue include 
user charges, fees, and excise and property taxes.  These taxes are based on “the principle 
of benefit” that users should pay for services provided.  Other potential sources of 
revenue are retail sales taxes, income taxes, and value added taxes.  But these taxes are 
usually collected centrally and shared between different levels of government in most 
developing countries.  Intergovernmental transfers are the other major source of revenue 
for subnational government in most countries, due to limited tax bases and weak 
administrative capacity in setting tax rates and collecting and administering taxes.  In 
addition, borrowing is another option, but recent studies (Tanzi 1996; Rodden, Eskeland, 
and Litvack 2005; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006, Tommasi 2006) suggest this may 
be problematic because of the lack of hard budget constraints imposed on subnational 
government in most developing countries (and in many OECD countries).  Broadway and 
Shah (2007) argue that subnational governments are almost never self-sufficient 
financially—regardless of the political or constitutional definition of the nation—and 
have to rely on financial transfers from the central government.   Thus, at least in the 
short term, a key issue is how to design an effective intergovernmental transfer that 
ensures the adequate provision of public services.   
Finally, the paper examined challenges and potential impacts of decentralization, 
along with their implications for developing countries. In recent years, many developing 
countries have taken a keen interest in decentralization to address the problem of an 
inefficient public sector.  But, experience shows that the negative impacts of 
decentralization can undermine the benefits.  Some of the challenges for decentralization 
include the limited capacity of local government, corruption of local officials, and 
imperfect democratic systems.  These imply that decentralization may not fully deliver 
the intended objectives of improving public sector management and efficiency of 
resource allocation in the provision of public services.   
However, there is growing pressure to find an alternative to the ineffective 
centrally controlled provision of public services in many developing countries even if 
decentralization is not a panacea for correcting inadequate provision of public services.   
In order to fully take advantage of the potential benefits of dececentralization, Bahl 
(1999) suggests twelve rules that need to be in place for the viable implementation of 
fiscal decentralization.
37  For the first rule, Bahl argues that implementation should begin 
with a design of a comprehensive system and be prepared to deal with the transition 
problems during phase-in.  In addition, he considers that political autonomy is the most 
                                                 
37 See Bahl (1999) for detailed discussion on twelve rules for implementing fiscal decentralization. 
  20crucial element of a decentralized system, along with a significant set of expenditure 
responsibilities and a substantial amount of taxing powers, budget making autonomy, 
transparency, and a hard budget constraint.  At the same time, it is crucial for many 
developing countries to improve institutional design in order to reshape existing forms of 
organization of the public sector and improve the provision of public goods and services.  
Therefore, issues of accountability and incentives are as important as issues of optimal 
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This efficiency argument can be represented graphically by figure 1, in which i and j are 
the per capita quantities of two local goods to be provided.  LM is a budget constraint 
showing the quantities of i and j that can be produced.  A and B are (families of) 
indifference curves for local governments A and B respectively.  In a centralized system, 
the central government will settle on c, on indifference curves A’ and B’.  A’ and B’ are 
indifference curves inferior to indifference curves A and B.  In a decentralized system, 
local government A will settle at point a (producing ia and ja), on indifference curve A; 
and local government B will settle at b, on difference curve B.  Thus, decentralized 
provision implies a welfare gain compared with central provision. 
 
 
Figure 1. Welfare Benefits of Decentralization 
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